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Abstract
Reputation systems provided by online auction
sites are the only countermeasure available for buyers
to evaluate a seller's credit. Unfortunately, feedback
score mechanisms are too easily manipulated creating
falsely overrated reputations. Therefore, developing an
effective fraud detection method can assist the user in
identifying cases offraud However, none of existing
research addresses the most important issue of early
fraud detection, which is, discovering a fraudster
before he defrauds. For effective early fraud detection
for online auctions, this paper proposes a novel
phased detection framework to identify a potential
fraudster as early as possible. To heighten precision in
detection, different quantifiable behavioral features
were extracted and integrated with regression model
trees to build phased fraud behavior models. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method,
real transaction data were collected from Taiwan's
Yahoo!Kimofor training and testing. The experimental
results with these models show that the recall rate of
fraud detection is over 82%.
1. Introduction
Convenience and anonymity are two main
distinguishing features of online auctions that also
caused convenient loopholes for fraudsters. For
instance, fraudsters can create multiple accounts which
can be used to inflate the reputation of each other
thereby increasing the odds to successfully deceive.
Fraudsters can also collude with each other as in an
accomplice syndicate, through which swift
communication and connection enables easy
defrauding. According to the Internet Crime Complaint
Center, statistics showed that the total dollar loss of
online auctions fraud being over $43m [1]. The
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statistic clearly shows effective fraud detection and
prevention mechanisms for online auctions are critical.
Existing reputation systems estimate the reputation
of a trader by accumulating quantifiable feedback
score from trading partners. As a result, fraudster
syndicates can always fabricate trading records to raise
their reputations until accumulated scores are at
satisfactory levels for their target victims at which
point more expensive items are offered by the fraudster.
Referring to these features, a fraud detection model
can be built by classification trees, regression analyses,
Bayesian network construction or fuzzy inference [2]-
[4]. However, we found that related literature do not
address the more important fact that fraud detection
models should be effective in discovering fraudsters
before they defraud. Further, current models have
difficulty detecting a fraudster's transaction behaviors
during his non-criminal period as these actions mimic
those of regular legitimate users. This paper proposes a
novel phased detection framework to identify a
potential fraudster as early as possible. Phased
modeling is capable of representing the different stages
of a fraudster's lifecycle and is used to distinguish
latent fraudsters from legitimate accounts. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods,
real transaction data were collected from Taiwan's
Yahoo!Kimo for training and testing. The results
showed that the recall rate of fraud detection was over
82.6%.
The rest of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2, the literature review, introduces existing
reputation systems, the design of different detection
indices, and discusses the relationship between
regression analysis and fraud detection. The third
section explains how transaction histories were
segmented to simulate fraudulent behaviors in the early
stages of a fraud. Section 4 describes how we induce
the featured indices from our observations of
fraudsters, and how to build detection models. Section
5 presents the experimental results. And fmally, the
conclusion and future research directions are presented
in the last section.
2. Related Work
For the convenience of further discussion, the
related research on reputation systems and regression
trees is introduced in this section.
2.1. Reputation Systems of Online Auctions
The estimated reputation between the received
feedback and the accumulated score can be represented
by the following simple equation,
AccumScore = AccmScore+1, if positive feedback,
AccmScore -1, if negative feedback, Unchanged, if
neutral feedback,
However, several deficiencies exist in such a
simple calculation method, which are often utilized by
fraudsters. First, the score does not reflect the actual
credit level of a member. For example, the score is not
associated with the monetary value of a commodity.
Fraudsters have taken advantage of this loophole and
have learned to build their feedback scores through a
large number of low-valued transactions. When their
score is high enough, fraudsters will offer high-priced
products to attract target victims [5], [6]. Secondly,
negative feedback from one dissatisfied buyer does not
reflect the seriousness of a victim's loss. Fraudsters
can use fake personal information (or simply steal
others') to create multiple accounts to form a criminal
syndicate. These accomplice accounts then initiate
false trades and highly rate one another over a very
short period to accumulate high ratings [7].
2.2. Frauds in Online Auctions
According to our observations, a fraudster's
transaction history consists of both latency and
execution periods. The latency period consists of
planning and preparing for swindles and the execution
period focuses on targeting victims. On the contrary,
the transaction history of a legitimate account does not
comprise obvious irregular behaviors as demarcations
of different periods, and in practice, the transaction
history of a legitimate user should remain consistent,
regardless of its length,
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2.3. Regression Analysis and Decision Tree
Classification for Fraud Detection
Behavior modeling for fraud detection is one of the
most popular applications of regression analysis.
Mercer applied regression analysis to detect computer
frauds by identifying the main characteristics of a
computer fraud [8]. Brockett et al. also adopted
regression analysis combined with specialists'
expertise and experience to detect insurance claim
fraud [9]. In addition, Kirkos validated the
effectiveness of applying logistic regression to identify
fmancial frauds [10]. Moreover, Kauffman and Wood
used similar methods to predict reserve-price shilling
in auctions [11].
In addition to regression analysis, decision trees
have been applied to deal with fraud detection for
decades as well. ID3 and C4.5 algorithms are the most
commonly used algorithms for inducing decision trees
[12]. Much of the research has demonstrated that
decision tree classification is also a promising
technique in modeling and identifying different kinds
of fraudsters [13], [2], [3], [4]. Breiman proposed an
approach that incorporated a decision tree inducer for
discrete classes, and a scheme for inducing regression
trees, called classification and regression trees
(CART)[14]. Generally, regression is applicable in
trend prediction and decision trees are able to
transform a model into IF-THEN rules. The
combination of the two notable characteristics of
regression and decision trees of CART is quite
successful in solving fraud detection problems [10].
Quinlan proposed another tree inducer, M5 using
linear regression functions in the leaves. Frank used a
simple transformation of the tree inducer M5', based
Quinlan's M5; a model tree induction technique which
has proven successful in predicting continuous values
[15], [16], [17]. When most attributes are numeric, the
M5' model tree generates more accurate classifiers
than C5.0 [17]. So far, most research of online auction
fraud detection applies decision tree-based classifiers,
however, regression tree construction seems to have
received far less attention in academia [18].
3. Phased Modeling Framework for Early
Detection
Due to evidence-based principles, law enforcement
agencies are only able to arrest a suspect as a result of
an actual victim's testimony. This implies that without
the presence of a victim, fraud cannot be identified
meaning early detection or prevention of online fraud
is much more difficult.
Figure 1. Lifespan of a Fraudster
100% of Life Sp an for an Acco un t
---1
(Comp lete Transaction Histo ry)
3.1. Lifespan of Fraudsters and Early Fraud
Detection
A general procedure of online auction fraud
detection can be divided into the following two phases:
(1) Building models for fraudsters: the transaction
histories of fraudsters are collected and are combined
with those of normal traders to build a detection model
(2) Fraud detection: the transaction history of a
suspicious account will be fed into the detection model
to determine whether this account is a fraudster or not.
For phased modeling, the transaction history of a
trader is partitioned by the accumulated ratings. Given
an account u and transaction history TH(u)= {trl,
tr2, " ' , trn}, the r<'110 lifespan of u is denoted as
TH(u,r%)={ tr1, tr2, ''' , trd}, and d9n*r<'110l. For
example, if n=50, then TH(u, 80%) would be { tr1,
tr2, "' , tr40 }. We use M(r<'Io) for behavior model in
r<'/o phase, or the model for r<'110 of lifespan.
the end of the fraudster's lifecycle has not been
reached, the behaviors of the potential fraudster should
match those of the 100% fraud detection models.
During the latency period, the 100% detection model
would fail to identify a fraudster because no criminal
behavioral traits are present. In such a case, other
detection models built by using different phases of a
fraudsters' lifespan could then be used to test the
suspicious target.
IExecution PeriodLatency Peri od
From our observation; a fraudster's lifespan can be
divided into the latency period and the execution
period (Shown as Figure I). The latency period is the
stage of planning scams, in which preparation and
developing high feedback scores are the main activities.
The execution period is the stage where victims are
targeted and scamming occurs. In practice, during the
latency period a fraudster could appear to be behaving
as a regular legitimate user. Though some fraudsters
may exhibit sophisticated patterns during the latency
period, these would be very difficult for most online
auction users to detect. On the contrary, even novice
buyers easily identify the behavior of a fraudster
during the execution period. The previous discussion
implies that if the fraud detection model relies solely
on behavior during the execution period, it would be
ineffective for early detection. We consider that well-
designed fraud detection mechanisms should be
capable of identifying not only potential fraudsters, but
also when they might commit frauds.
To identify a premeditated fraudster during the
latency period, a phased modeling framework is
proposed for early detection. In the proposed
framework, aside from the entire transaction history of
a fraudster (100%), the behaviors in different phases of
the fraudster's lifespan (e.g., 80% and 90% of the
lifespan) are also used to build detection models
respectively. According to our observations, a
transaction history that includes fraud(s) can easily be
identified by the 100% detection model, which means
the fraud has already occurred. In addition, the 100%
model implies the transaction history contains the
fraud execution point somewhere close to the end of
the lifecycle. Therefore, it stands to reason that even if
3.2. Procedures for Early Detection
When an account is judged as not currently
committing fraud, it implies a fraud will occur
sometime after the checkpoint of our phased models.
In our approach, we exclude all impossible points to
narrow the range of a fraud occurrence. Though this
approach might affect the precision rate slightly, it will
still be suitable for sending warning messages. False
predictions would cause extreme money loss,
especially misidentifying a fraudster as a legitimate
seller. Therefore, we created a conceptual strainer that
is analogous to hybrid-phased models (Figure 2).
Conceptually the strainer works with transaction
behavior as it does with other material; a large-holed
strainer is used first to filter fraudsters and legitimate
accounts. In this way, all accounts matching phase
80%-100% will be filtered out. Next a smaller-holed
strainer filters phase 85%-100% fraudulent behaviors,
and another fmer strainer is used to filter out fraudsters
in phase 90%-100%, and then to deal with phase 95%-
100%. Finally, we apply the finest-holed strainer to
eliminate phase 100%, so as to accomplish early online
auction fraud detection.
Figure 2. Conceptual Strainers for Phased
Models
745
4. Construction of the Fraud Detection
Model
The quality of a constructed tree is closely related to
the selected attributes in classification.
4.1. Online Auction Fraud Detection
Measuring Factors
Most previous related work related to the statistics
generated using open transaction information of online
auction sites for factors measuring fraudulent behavior,
such as percentage of positive and negative feedback
ratings, average, standard deviation and median
commodity prices within a specific time range, and so
on [2], [3], [19] In addition to numerical values (such
as the starting bid) and Boolean values for denoting
particular status (such as being a shop owner) [7],
there are other more sophisticated attributes, such as
using K-core in a transaction network which is helpful
for detecting reputation inflation [3], [4], [19], [20].
Even though many factors for fraud detection have
been proposed, few take the time-dependent behaviors
of a fraudster into consideration. For example, if an
account suddenly obtains many positive ratings within
a short time, it could be inferred that the seller is
suspect of artificially raising feedback scores. To
further take into account the time-dependent behaviors
of fraudsters, 7 measuring factors in numeric have
been developed for constructing decision trees for
online auction fraud detection. Two have been
commonly used in the previous work and five of them
have been newly developed in this work (Refer to
Table 1).
Table 1. Measuring Factors
Factor Description
DensityOfPos Density of obtaining positive ratings
DensitvOtNeg Densitv of obtaining negative ratinzs
EndCloseToPos Density of obtaining positive ratings
after closinz bid
RatioOfSToS Given being a seller, the ratio of
positive ratings from other sellers to all
[positive ratings
LastNegCloseToCur Time difference from the last negative
rating to the current time
RatioOfPos Ratio of positive ratings to total
feedback count
RatioOtNeg Ratio of negative ratings to total
feedback count
4.2 Building Fraudster Models Based on Model
Trees
Both regression trees and model trees incorporate
the characteristics of decision trees and regression
analyses. An online auction fraud case could
potentially be discovered through different
combinations of multiple irregular behaviors. Thus, it
seems that constructing a single model, which could
identify all types of fraud, would be impossible. Since
construction model trees inherently contain multiple
regression models, they are especially effective in
providing a solution to this problem. There are various
kinds of regression techniques and decision trees
which can be integrated for classification in most cases.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on model trees
with linear regression equations in which linear
regression equations are the decision criteria in
transforming multiple linear regression models for
classification. One regression model was built for each
class value based on the concept of Classification via
Regression [17]. In this work, the
ClassificationViaRegression classifier has been used in
Weka3.6.0 which implements base routines for
generating M5' model trees and rules to identify
fraudsters.
5. Experimental Results
5.1 Evaluation Metrics and Data Set
To show the effectiveness of our approach, the
following parameters were adopted as the metrics for
comparison and evaluation (Shown as Table 2), In this
context, a Positive case is one corresponding to a fraud;
on the other hand, Negative stands for a non-fraud case.
Table 2. Evaluation Metrics
Metric Definition
TP Rate TP/(TP+FN)
FP Rate FP/(FP+TN)
Precision TP/(TP+FP)
Recall TP/(TP+FN)
F-Measure 2 >Recall >Precision/(Reca ll+ Precision)
T=True F=False P= Positive N=Negative
To prepare a data set for testing, we collected the
transaction histories of 1,467 accounts from Taiwan's
Yahoo!Kimo auction site, comprising of236 fraudsters
and 1231 legal traders. The transaction history of each
account is segmented into 5 different phases (phase
80%, 85%, 90%, 95% and 100%) in order to extract
phased behavioral features respectively. We randomly
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select 312 legitimate accounts and 156 fraudsters as a
training set. The results of all extracted features were
combined to form a data set consisting of 2,340 phased
behavior profiles with 7 factors. The data of the
training set was then used to build hybrid phased
models (Refer to Figure 3) applying Adaboost with
ClassificationViaRegression classifier in Weka3.6.0.
In addition to the training sets, we randomly selected
156 legitimate accounts and 78 fraudsters from the
remaining data to generate 1,170 phased profiles were
reserved for testing.
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Figure 3. Hybrid Phased Models
5.2 Experimental Results of Classification of
Phased Models
The experimental results of classification of phased
models are presented as table 2.
Table 2. Experimental Results
TP FP Preci Recal F- ClassRate Rate sion I Measure
0.873 0.173 0.909 0.873 0.89 Legit
0.826 0.126 0.765 0.826 0.794 Fraud
The behavioral features of a fraudster with a complete
(phase 100%) transaction history were found to be
unlikely during the latency period. Therefore, to screen
behavioral changes during the latency period, we
segmented the transaction history into different phases
in order to emulate the early stage movements. From
this, behavioral models were built respectively. In our
experimental observations, some fraudsters in phase
80%-85% carried out legitimate trades in order to lure
expected potential victim responses. When fraudsters
advanced to phase 90%, their behaviors were similar to
phase 80% in terms of time. Therefore, differentiating
phases 80% and 90% proved difficult. However,
behaviors in phase 80% differed from phase 100% in
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which behaviors were more aggressive in order to
obtain results. The changes in behavior were
analogous to our conceptual strainer theory for
refmement. First, we categorized fraudsters into phase
100%, then phase 95%, and so on. Successively, we
predicted which period the categorized fraudsters were
approximately. We use a set of consecutive conceptual
strainers for identifying the phase of a fraudster with
individual phased models respectively (Shown as
Figure 4, FrOio stands for fraudsters in phase rOlo.)
Figure 4. Fraudster's Phase Identification
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Under the current conditions, it is more practical to
continue using existing reputation systems to enhance
the capability of early detection of online auction fraud.
Our experimental results show that Recall rate of
detection current and potential fraudsters by the phased
behavior models is 82.6%. The results not only
demonstrate the effectiveness of the factors we have
devised and the feasibility of our early detection theory,
but also reflect behavior combinations of fraudsters in
the real world. Even though our findings have
demonstrated practicality in online auctions, some
shortcomings require improvement in the future: (l)
Our approach cannot grapple with identity theft.
Because the transaction history we used did not belong
to a thief, accounts always enter the execution period
directly without any preparation. (2) It is difficult to
identify the exact reasons sellers obtain negative
ratings. Certain personal dissatisfaction or other non-
criminal reasons may cause negative ratings, which
might lower the dependability and lead to misjudging a
legitimate seller as a fraudster. (3) Shorter lifespan
trends of fraudsters reduce users' response time. (4)
The devised behavioral models are ineffective in the
very early period of the transaction history.
Particularly, it is not useful in building an effective
detection model for behavior before phase 80%.
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